Defense-in-Depth Against Frame Spoofing, Denial-of-Service & Bus-Off Attacks on CAN Networks

Abstract: Empirical penetration testing of vehicular bus injection vectors and the rigorous validation of SecOC cryptographic countermeasures.

1. Threat Modeling the Automotive Bus Modern vehicle attack vectors frequently exploit the unauthenticated nature of CAN 2.0B. Attackers inject spoofed frames with high priority (ID 0x000) to cause continuous bus arbitration win, starving legitimate safety controllers.

2. SecOC Implementation Analysis This study evaluates the defensive efficacy of SecOC across 1,000,000 simulated injection and bit-flip attacks. By enforcing truncated 28-bit CMACs combined with a synchronized Freshness Counter, 100% of injected and replayed frames were successfully dropped at the hardware CanIf filter layer without causing host CPU exhaustion.